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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DETERRING OPPORTUNISM THROUGH CLAWBACKS: LESSONS
FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FROM MINOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL
INTRODUCTION
Highly talented baseball players are scarce commodities. For this reason,
they often command large sums of money prior to ever stepping on a major
league baseball field, as teams annually pay large bonuses to the most talented
players drafted in Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) amateur draft. Combined,
the thirty MLB teams awarded $228,009,050 in signing bonuses to 2011
draftees.1 The most talented individuals—the first-round draftees—received on
average $2,653,375 per player in 2011.2 Both numbers set records for
spending, as did the $8 million bonus given to the number one overall pick,
Gerrit Cole.3
These sums of money are not given for performance but are given simply
as an incentive to sign with the team. Teams view these expenditures as
investments into the future of their organization, but the development of
baseball players can be risky business.4 For instance, over the twenty-five
drafts from 1981 to 2005, a total of 32.7 percent of the top draftees never
played in the major leagues.5 Injuries frequently occurred, and players
sometimes simply walked away from the game and retired after only a few
years. When they did, they took their bonuses with them.
In 2006, MLB recommended that teams protect these investments by using
clawback provisions in initial minor league contracts.6 The practice quickly
caught fire, and the clawback provision became an industry standard.7 The
provision acts as a deterrent to opportunistic behavior,8 and, as will be seen

1. Jim Callis, No Matter the Slots, Teams Spent Freely in 2011, BASEBALL AM. (Aug. 18,
2011), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2011/2612233.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part II.A.2.
5. Marty Dobrow, MLB draft can be risky business, ESPNBOSTON.COM, http://sports.espn.
go.com/boston/columns/story?id=6628930 (last updated June 6, 2011).
6. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, Vice President of Baseball Operations, San
Francisco Giants (Oct. 20, 2011).
7. See infra Part II.A.3.
8. See George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 953–961 (1992) (discussing the doctrine of opportunism).
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below, it is possible that both team and player benefit from this new
contractual agreement.
Just as clawbacks in baseball are a relatively new phenomenon, the general
use of clawbacks in contracts is also a relatively new development. However,
clawback clauses have increased dramatically in recent years, particularly in
executive compensation contracts.9 Executive compensation clawbacks gained
much attention with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.10
Attention heightened when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,
which requires all publicly listed companies to now include clawback
provisions in their executive compensation agreements.11 Yet despite the
increased usage of clawbacks, they are not without critics. The study of them is
still nascent, and many commentators question the utility and fundamental
fairness of contractual clawbacks.12
This Comment begins by discussing possible definitions offered for
clawbacks and the evolution of their use in executive compensation
agreements, both before and after the 2008 financial crisis. It continues by
analyzing clawback provisions in minor league contracts. A discussion of the
events leading to their widespread implementation in baseball will be followed
by a discussion on their benefit from a law and economics perspective. Their
enforceability will also briefly be addressed, as the use of these clawbacks in
minor league contracts is not without some procedural unconscionability.
As will become apparent, the use of prospective clawbacks in minor league
contracts demonstrates the utility of clawbacks as a tool to protect risky
investments, to deter opportunisitic behavior by reallocating risk, and to recoup
losses after the exhibition of opportunistic behavior. Their increased usage
should continue in other contractual realms where opportunism is possible,
such as executive compensation agreements.

9. See, e.g., Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 723
(2011) (stating that more than 80% of Fortune 100 firms began using clawbacks even before the
Dodd-Frank Act required it); Matthew A. Melone, Adding Insult to Injury: The Federal Income
Tax Consequences of the Clawback of Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 120 (2010)
(“Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating.”).
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). SOX allowed for the
clawing back of executive bonuses in certain circumstances of wrongdoing. Id.
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1806 (2011) (stating that clawbacks are both overinclusive in
some aspects and underinclusive in others); Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the
Omnipresent Claw: In Response to Professors Cherry & Wong, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1,
6
(2010),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Macchiarola_
PDF1.pdf (stating that clawbacks are unnecessarily inflexible).
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I. CLAWBACKS GENERALLY
A.

Clawbacks Defined

Though the usage of clawbacks has increased in the past decade, the study
of them is still in its nascent stage.13 As a result, the term often assumes a
different meaning depending on the context in which it is used.14 For instance,
the meaning of the term clawback when used in an employment relocation
contract will differ considerably from its meaning when used in the context of
electronic discovery.15
Black’s Law Dictionary supplies two potential meanings for clawback: 1)
“[m]oney taken back”, or 2) “[t]he retrieval or recovery of tax allowances by
additional forms of taxation.”16 Neither definition offers anything truly
meaningful to the emerging doctrine of clawbacks. The simplicity and
broadness of the first definition renders it nearly useless—it is almost limitless
in its nature—while the second provides a more specific definition that is
inapplicable to the more common modern usages of the term.
Perhaps due to the lack of a consistent, useful definition of the term,
Professors Cherry and Wong recently offered their own definition.17 They
proposed “that a clawback be defined as a right to, or action for, the restitution
of unfair enrichment that is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing
applicable law.”18
Upon first glancing at this definition, one aspect immediately captures
attention: the introduction of the concept of “unfair enrichment.” In discussing
this term, Professors Cherry and Wong say that the concept of unfair
enrichment is related to the more traditional contract concept of unjust

13. For a discussion of the scant availability of scholarly works concerning clawbacks, see,
for example, Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 410–
412 (2009), and Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 410–11.
15. Compare John Chung, Are Relocation Package “Claw Back” Clauses Legal in China?,
CHINA LEGAL BRIEF (Mar. 17, 2011) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal)
(defining a clawback in a relocation agreement as a covenant requiring “the return of a portion or
all of the relocation bonus, payment or similar payments paid by the company if the employees
decide to leave the company within time periods specified in the agreement”), with Shira A.
Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two
Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 357 (2008)
(defining a clawback as used in electronic discovery as an “agreement regarding a procedure for
retrieving privileged information that has been inadvertently produced in the course of
discovery”).
16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (9th ed. 2009).
17. Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 412.
18. Id.
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enrichment, as both focus on the unjust nature of a person’s gains.19 Yet unfair
enrichment extends beyond unjust enrichment to include instances in which
“the person unfairly enriched has a preexisting legal right to payment.”20 Thus,
because of a legal right, unjust enrichment would not apply and the offending
person would be permitted to keep the benefit obtained, even if this were
unjust to the other party. However, the concept of unfair enrichment offers a
solution to this problem, as clawbacks offer the possibility of recouping all or
part of this unfair enrichment.
One might question whether this new concept is truly necessary, and,
indeed, this proposed definition is not without critics. For instance, Professor
Macchiarola recently remarked that the inclusion of unfair enrichment in the
definition “introduces unwelcomed subjectivity to decisions of whether and to
what extent a person’s monies might be subject to return at some future
date.”21 He also contended that the predictability of law would suffer, and the
transaction costs of contracting would rise.22
It should be noted that Professors Cherry and Wong distinguish between
two types of clawbacks that manage to co-exist within their definition.23 The
first type, deemed a retroactive clawback, is imposed after the contractual right
has arisen and after the benefit conferred.24 Conversely, a prospective
clawback is introduced into a contract before the contractual right occurs and
before the benefit conferred.25
Prospective clawbacks operate more effectively than retroactive
clawbacks,26 and many of the ills described by Professor Macchiarola
disappear when clawbacks are used prospectively.27 Since the terms of the
clawback result from the contractual process of drafting the provision, the
uncertainties inherent in retroactive clawbacks disappear.28 Moreover, the
parties have bargained for the terms in prospective clawbacks, so each side has
had the opportunity to accept or reject the exact terms of the agreement.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 413.
Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 7.
Id.
Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 371–72.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.
Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Reply: Clawback to the Future, 95 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 19, 24 (2010), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
Wong_Cherry_PDF.pdf.
28. Id.
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Use of Clawbacks in Executive Compensation Agreements

Whether done prospectively or retroactively, the usage of clawbacks has
clearly increased in recent years.29 One prominent area in which clawbacks are
now frequently used is in executive compensation agreements.30 Their usage in
such agreements both before and after the 2008 financial crisis will be
discussed below.
1.

Executive Compensation Clawbacks Prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis

President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) into law in 2002,
and with it arrived the legal possibility of executive compensation clawbacks.31
If a company is forced to issue an accounting restatement due to material
noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement, the law allows the SEC
to recoup any incentive-based compensation received within the twelve-month
period preceding the restatement.32
This provision, however, has its limitations. The clawing back is only
permitted when the restatement results from misconduct.33 Also, only the
budget-constrained SEC can initiate the clawback.34 For these and other
reasons, the clawback provision of SOX was almost never used except when
an executive was convicted of criminal fraud.35
After the passage of SOX, some companies began voluntarily
implementing their own clawback policies that went beyond the SOX
requirements.36 In 2006, around eighteen percent of Fortune 100 firms utilized
clawback provisions, and by the middle of 2010 the number of Fortune 100
firms implementing clawbacks had grown to eighty percent.37 Close to fifty
percent of Fortune 500 firms had implemented clawbacks by this date.38
29. Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back if You Didn’t Earn It, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008
(Sunday Business), at 1.
30. See, e.g., Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 723 (stating that more than 80% of Fortune
100 firms began using clawbacks even before the Dodd-Frank Act began requiring it); Melone,
supra note 9, at 120 (“Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating.”).
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 731.
35. Id.; see also Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 376–77 (stating that the clawback
provision of SOX has “been largely ignored” and that only two enforcement actions were brought
in the first seven years after the passage of the Act). But cf. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas,
New Clawback Requirements for Listed Public Companies, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 2010, at 3 (noting
that although the SEC has traditionally only initiated a clawback suit when the CEO or CFO is
personally involved in the misconduct, the SEC has recently taken a more aggressive approach in
regulating this issue).
36. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 735–36.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 736.
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Nevertheless, most of these clawbacks lacked robust enforcement provisions,
as they did not require directors to recoup excess pay, but instead granted
directors discretionary powers.39 The majority of those that did require
recoupment only did so when misconduct occurred.40
The discretionary nature of these provisions severely limited their utility,
as the personal cost to directors of instituting a recoupment procedure was
likely to dwarf the personal benefit gained by directors from any type of
recovery.41 Also, the misconduct hurdle further permitted excess pay to be
hoarded by undeserving executives.42 Consequently, companies had little
chance of recouping any excess pay despite the enactment of these provisions.
2.

Executive Compensation Clawbacks After the 2008 Financial Crisis

On September 29, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 778
points.43 It was the largest single-day drop in the history of the widely used
index, as $1.2 trillion in market value vanished in a matter of hours.44 As
Warren Buffett would later say, the economy had “fallen off a cliff,” and the
losses continued to mount.45 By March 9, 2009, the index had fallen to
6547.0546—almost fifty-four percent below its all-time high of 14,164.53
reached only seventeen months before.47
Banks failed in large numbers, 48 home values catapulted downward,49 and
the federal government scrambled to inject money into a failing financial
system.50 The effort culminated with the enactment of the controversial
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) in October of 2008.51

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 737.
Id.
Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 739.
Id. at 741.
Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, 7% Drop in Dow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at

A1.
44. See id.
45. Betsy Stark, Tracking the Dow One Year After Rock Bottom, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/year-ago-today-dow-hit-bottom-recession/story?id=10046578.
46. Id.
47. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) History Chart: January 1, 1931 Through August
12, 2011, http://www.nyse.tv/djia-chart-history.htm (last visited June 10, 2012).
48. See Bank Failures in Brief, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2009/ (last
updated Jan. 20, 2012) (reporting that 140 banks failed in 2009 alone).
49. Les Christie, Home Prices: ‘Double-dip’ Confirmed, CNNMONEY (May 31, 2011, 10:43
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/31/real_estate/march_home_prices/index.htm.
50. Among the many measures taken, almost $200 billion was extended to mortgage lenders
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September of 2008. David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie,
CNNMONEY (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fan
nie_freddie/index.htm. Additionally, insurance giant AIG received $85 billion the same month.
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject
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TARP placed limits on executive compensation for those financial
companies receiving funds from the program.52 However, it wasn’t until the
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that an
attempt was made to claw back portions of excess bonuses paid out with funds
from TARP.53 The statute required the recovery “of any bonus, retention
award, or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer and any of
the next [twenty] most highly-compensated employees . . . based on [financial
statements] that are later found to be materially inaccurate.”54 Yet the Act also
stated that it would not prohibit the paying of a bonus for employment
contracts executed prior to February 11, 2009.55
The effect of the TARP clawback requirement was muted.56 Kenneth
Feinberg, nominated by President Obama to be the “watchdog” for executive
pay, found in 2010 that seventeen companies paid out $1.6 billion in bonuses
after receiving bailout money the previous year.57 Though he remarked the
bonuses were paid in “bad judgment,” he also noted that “they didn’t violate
any statute, they didn’t violate any regulation at the time.”58 He also remarked
that “[t]he taxpayer has a right to be outraged.”59
In response to this report and the public’s outrage, President Obama
reemphasized the importance of financial reform legislation.60 In fact, just days
before the Feinberg report surfaced, President Obama signed into law the

Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1221565
61931242905.html.
51. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122304922742602533.html.
52. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2006 & Supp.
IV 2008) (providing required guidelines for a company receiving bailout funds); see also Hitt &
Solomon, supra note 51. For a more in-depth discussion of the subsequent bailouts, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93
MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008).
53. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat.
115, 516–520 (2009) (amending the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).
54. Id. at 517.
55. Id. at 518.
56. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 385 (noting that the Act was weak and ineffective
in limiting compensation); see also Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency
of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12338735231015424
1.html (describing the loopholes of the TARP requirements).
57. Matthew Jaffe, ‘Right to be Outraged:’ Pay Czar Slams Banks for Executive Pay After
Bailouts, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pay-czar-report-slamsbanks-executive-pay-bailouts/story?id=11235894.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.61 With it came the requirement of clawbacks in
executive compensation agreements.62
3.

Clawbacks Required by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

The Dodd-Frank Act requires all publicly listed companies to include
clawbacks prospectively in their incentive compensation packages.63 The
clawback provision triggers when a company is forced to prepare an
accounting restatement due to a material noncompliance.64 More specifically,
the company must recover incentive-based compensation from executive
officers derived from 1) erroneous data; 2) received during a “[three]-year
period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an
accounting restatement”; 3) in excess of the pay that would have resulted under
the restatement.65 The clawback must be strong enough to allow the company
to recover any compensation that executives derive from erroneous data in
excess of what would have been paid under the restatement.66
One of the chief benefits of this requirement is that it forces companies to
include clawbacks that trigger whether or not the executive engages in any
misconduct.67 This represents a difference—and an improvement68—from
SOX, which required misconduct and lessened the likelihood that the provision
would ever be enforced.69 However, the Act has been criticized for only
requiring clawbacks that trigger when an accounting restatement is issued.70
Furthermore, it might permit executives “to keep excess pay arising from the
sale of equity incentives at inflated prices.”71 Also, some have commented that
61. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Contentious Overhaul of the Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3.
62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010); see also Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 745 (stating that
section 954 of Dodd-Frank requires every listed company to put in place a clawback policy).
63. Dodd-Frank Act § 954.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 746.
68. Not all would agree that this is an improvement. In fact, Professor Bainbridge describes
the Dodd-Frank clawback as “seriously flawed” partly because the requirement will overinclusively result in some innocent executive officers forfeiting pay despite their lack of
responsibility. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1806.
69. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 730.
70. Id. at 747–48. Professors Fried and Shilon state that “[a] restatement requirement is
problematic because an executive could receive excess pay even if a restatement is not considered
to be required.” Id. at 748. This could be for one of three reasons: 1) a small accounting error
would not necessarily require a restatement but could trigger a large compensation bonus; 2) a
firm may use non-financial metrics in calculating an executive’s bonus; or 3) a firm may find that
a restatement isn’t necessary even though neutral observers would believe the contrary. Id.
71. Id. at 751.
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the Act lacks a procedural mechanism for enforcement.72 It remains possible
that this latter concern might be alleviated once the SEC, as the agency
charged with implementing the Act, develops its rules for the clawback
requirement.73 However, the SEC has yet to adopt rules for this portion of the
Act.74
For this reason, some have suggested that firms should go beyond the
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act and voluntarily institute more robust
clawback provisions.75 The clawback could be written in a way that not only
complies with Dodd-Frank requirements, but also allows for a broader
approach that covers unanticipated events.76 In this manner, the clawback
would be mandatory in some circumstances, and in other circumstances the
board of directors could be given broad discretion in dealing with “inevitable,
real-world variation.”77
C. Are There Problems with Using Clawbacks?
As demonstrated above, the usage of clawbacks in areas such as executive
compensation has increased in recent years. In fact, with the passage of DoddFrank, prospective clawbacks have become a legal requirement for companies.
While many would cheer this development, others find problems with this
increased usage.
Some have remarked that the entire arrival of clawbacks reflects a
reactionary approach. For instance, the passage of SOX took place hastily in

72. Cherry & Wong, supra note 27, at 22 (expressing concerns that a shareholder derivative
suit might be needed to actually claw back the compensation).
73. Cf. Klein & Pappas, supra note 35, at 9. (discussing the possibility of the SEC adopting
rules for de minimis clawbacks similar to that adopted in TARP regulation).
74. Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Upcoming Activity, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (stating that rules regarding the recovery of executive compensation
were planned for implementation between July 2012 and December 2012).
75. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 27, at 22–23 (stating the Dodd-Frank Act “certainly
could be stronger” and that companies are free to go beyond the requirements); Fried & Shilon,
supra note 9, at 749 (stating all firms should include clawback provisions that will trigger
whether a restatement is necessary or not). But see Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1815–16
(finding no utility in any of the corporate governance measures included in Dodd-Frank since
corporate governance flaws were not a cause of the financial crisis).
76. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Making Sense of Clawbacks and Holdbacks, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:59 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/aug
2010/ca20100813_666706.htm.
77. Id. Of course, granting a board of directors such discretion might limit the utility of any
clawback provision, as it will make it unlikely that the board will ever exercise this discretion in a
manner adverse to management.
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the wake of Enron and other corporate fiascos.78 Similarly, the drafting and
passage of Dodd-Frank took place as a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis.79
Consequently, some see Congress as quickly acquiescing to public pressure,
and perhaps recklessly enacting unnecessary and destructive legislation simply
to appease mass outrage.80
In addition to these reactionary concerns, others express concerns over the
increase in uncertainty that clawbacks add.81 In a world of compensation
uncertainty, an executive will constantly be “monitoring the rear view mirror”
and will never be “free to relax.”82 Moreover, the valuation difficulties that
may lead to the clawback-inducing problem in the first place will likely still be
present at a later date.83 At this later date, any evaluation might also be affected
by hindsight bias.84
There might also be practical difficulties in getting a person to pay back
money when enforcing a clawback, as checks are cashed quickly and money
spent even quicker.85 Additionally, an overly aggressive clawback provision
might stifle beneficial risk-taking and hamper the recruitment of new corporate
talent.86 Lastly, a clawback may result in unfair tax implications.87
While some of these concerns might be legitimate, the utility of clawbacks
outweighs the potential drawbacks, as another industry far from Wall Street
demonstrates. The industry? Professional baseball, whose franchises frequently
utilize clawbacks to protect bonus-laden contracts and to tame opportunistic
behavior.
II. CLAWBACKS IN MINOR LEAGUE CONTRACTS
A.

The Origin of Clawbacks in Baseball Contracts

Each year as MLB teams seek to reload and upgrade the young talent
within their organizations, large bonuses are paid to previously amateur

78. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1081 (2008)
(describing SOX as “crisis-inspired legislation”).
79. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1782–83 (stating that “populist outrage motivated
Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank [Act] . . .”).
80. See id. at 1786 (stating that congressional intrusion into corporate governance occurs in a
cycle of “boom, bust, and regulation,” and SOX and Dodd-Frank were simply the latest iterations
of this).
81. Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 7.
82. Id. at 7–8.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Melone, supra note 9, at 72.
87. Id. at 75.
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players. As noted in the Introduction, the thirty MLB teams combined to award
$228,009,050 in signing bonuses to 2011 draftees,88 most being between the
age of eighteen and twenty-one. This total amount did not include the large
sums of money spent on Latin American players,89 who are not subject to
MLB’s Rule 4 draft.90 The very top draftees annually command signing
bonuses in the millions of dollars, with this year’s number one pick in the Rule
4 draft, Gerrit Cole, netting an $8 million signing bonus.91
Despite the large sums of money paid upfront to amateur players, the
investment remains risky.92 These young players possess the impressive talent
that leads to the ability to command large signing bonuses, yet many fail to
blossom as projected. Incredibly, of the 917 first-round draft picks from the
twenty-five year period between 1981 and 2005, 32.7% never played in the
major leagues.93 Furthermore, 19.2% of the total top-ten overall picks from the
same time period—the most talented draftees of all—never reached the major
leagues.94 Most incredibly, two of the number one overall selections never
even stepped on a major league diamond.95
These picks represent the best of the best—players who have been vetted
almost as extensively as Supreme Court nominees.96 Faced with such a risky

88. Callis, supra note 1.
89. MLB teams spent an estimated $102 million on Latino signing bonuses for the year
ending in 2010. Kevin Baxter, Latin American Baseball Players Train Hard to Build English
Skills, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/30/sports/lasp-0701-baseball-esl-classes-20110701/2.
90. For a thorough discussion of MLB’s current draft system and the possible legal problems
that result from excluding certain players from the draft based on nationality, see Daniel
Hauptman, The Need for a Worldwide Draft to Level the Playing Field and Strike Out the
National Origin Discrimination in Major League Baseball, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 263
(2009–10). See also Jim Callis, MLB’s Amateur Attitude is Baffling, BASEBALL AM. (July 13,
2011), http://www.baseballamerica.com/online/prospects/column/2011/2612097.html (discussing
the differences between the process for acquiring international talent and for acquiring domestic
talent, and discussing the continued escalation of international signing bonuses within a free
market system).
91. Callis, supra note 1.
92. Dobrow, supra note 5.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Brien Taylor, picked by the New York Yankees in 1991, and Matt Bush, picked by the
San Diego Padres in 2004, never reached the major leagues. Id.
96. Each team has a legion of “bird dogs,” area scouts, cross-checkers, international scouts,
and assistant general managers that constantly assess amateur talent. Top prospects are usually
observed over a period of several years by multiple people within an organization before being
selected. See, e.g., Amalie Benjamin, Search Party: Red Sox Scouts are Always on the Lookout
for Talent, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008, available at http://articles.boston.com/2008-1228/sports/29272903_1_scouts-minor-leagues-draft (describing the incessant scouting process
employed by the Boston Red Sox).
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investment, MLB has tried a number of measures, with the primary approach
to the problem97 focusing on efforts to suppress signing bonuses.
1.

MLB’s Efforts to Suppress Signing Bonuses

Major League Baseball has long engineered various mechanisms to curtail
signing bonuses of amateur athletes. As long ago as 1946, MLB instituted a
bonus rule that required a team to place any player signed to a bonus above a
fixed amount (often $4,000 to $6,000) on the major league roster.98 With only
a limited amount of major league roster spots, baseball executives hoped this
would deter teams from signing numerous amateur players to bonuses above
the threshold.99
Despite this rule, teams continued to spend on top talent, prompting the
adoption of a new rule in 1959.100 Deemed the “first-year draft rule,” it
required teams to protect their top prospects on the equivalent of an expanded
major league roster or else risk losing the players to other teams.101 When this
too failed to curb bonuses, the teams resorted to a more drastic measure: a
formal draft.102
MLB established the Rule 4 draft in 1965.103 Much like today,104 teams
selected draft picks in a set order and had exclusive negotiating rights with
their selections. Since teams were no longer free to compete with one another
for top talent, the draft immediately depressed signing bonuses.105 While five

97. Many would argue that, despite the risky investment, this is not a problem at all, as
acquiring talent through signing amateur players still remains the most cost-effective means of
acquiring talent. See Kevin Baxter, Talent Search Goes Out of States, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2011,
at C5 (discussing the cost-efficiencies of signing and developing international amateur players);
Andrew Keh, For Mets, Different Approach Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at B13
(discussing the New York Mets’ new approach to paying premium dollars for amateur players
since it is the “most cost-efficient way for a team to acquire talent”).
98. Allan Simpson, Despite Baseball’s Best Efforts, Bonuses Just Keep Growing, BASEBALL
AM., June 20–July 3, 2005, at 10.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 10–11. The rule allowed players to be protected on a “40-man” roster, as opposed
to the normal active roster consisting of twenty-five players. Id. If a prospect were not placed on
the 40-man roster, he would be subject to acquisition via waivers or the Rule 5 draft. Id. A system
with many modifications and differences from this 1959 system still exists. See Kary Booher,
Explaining the Rule 5 Draft, BASEBALL AM. (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.baseballameri
ca.com/today/majors/news/2008/267230.html (describing the Rule 5 draft process).
102. Simpson, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. For a description of current rules, see First-Year Player Draft, Official Rules,
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited June 20, 2012).
105. Simpson, supra note 98.
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players in 1964 had signed six-figure bonuses, only the number one overall
pick commanded such a bonus in 1965.106
For more than two decades, the depressed bonuses persisted. In fact, in
1987, the highly talented Ken Griffey, Jr.—the number one overall pick—
signed with the Seattle Mariners for a mere $169,000 bonus.107 It seemed MLB
had solved its problem of escalating signing bonuses, yet the solution proved
temporary.
Soon after Griffey signed, bonuses began to escalate again. The year 1989
marked a dramatic intensification of negotiation, with rising super-agent Scott
Boras securing a $350,000 bonus for Ben McDonald.108 Only a few years later
in 1993, Boras secured an astounding $1.55 million bonus for a high school
lefty named Brien Taylor.109 Average bonus payments to first-round picks
skyrocketed from $252,577 in 1990 to $613,037 in 1993.110 And the escalation
did not cease there.
In 1996, Boras and other agents used a loophole in the draft process to
allow four draft-eligible players to become free agents.111 Once on the open
market, the players freely negotiated with all major league teams. The result:
Matt White inked a $10.2 million bonus with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays.112
The other three players inked deals of $10 million, $6.075 million, and $3
million.113
Faced with this escalation, MLB again sought new methods of depressing
signing bonuses. In 2000, MLB instituted signing bonus guidelines (or
recommendations) to teams in the form of “soft slotting.”114 For each pick in
106. Id.
107. Ross Newhan, Costly Draft Could Leave Some Teams Cold, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at
C12.
108. Simpson, supra note 98. The $350,000 bonus was part of an overall package worth
$824,300. Id. Another player, John Olerud, received a $575,000 bonus as part of an $800,000
package the same year. Id.; see also Bob Nightengale, Only the Money is Guaranteed, USA
TODAY, June 3, 2009, at 1C. (comparing Ben McDonald to Stephen Strasburg, who was also
represented by Scott Boras twenty years later).
109. Simpson, supra note 98; Jim Bowden, The GM’s Office: Negotiating with Scott Boras,
ESPN (June 4, 2011), http://m.espn.go.com/mlb/story?storyId=6625521&pg=1&wjb=.
110. Simpson, supra note 98.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. MLB could not make the slotting recommendations mandatory, as such a change
would need to be established through collective bargaining with the Major League Baseball
Players Association. MLB executives still seek mandatory slotting today, and the issue was
discussed during the 2011 collective bargaining talks. See Callis, supra note 90 (noting that MLB
wanted a hard slotting system); Jon Heyman, Draft Maneuvers by Nationals, Pirates Drawing the
Ire of Selig, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/jon_heyman/08/19/draft-cap/in
dex.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2011, 4:01PM) (stating that Commissioner Selig’s biggest
interest in the 2011 negotiations was a new slotting system). It was not expected to be included in
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the first five rounds, MLB provided teams with specific bonus
recommendations, and for each pick after the fifth round, a flat cap on bonuses
was instituted.115 Teams were pressured to stay within the recommended bonus
levels for each of the top picks in the draft.116 Nevertheless, the guidelines
were not mandatory.117 Although the soft slotting system curbed the escalation
in signing bonuses,118 it did not depress them.119 For this reason, MLB teams
began to turn to other measures in order to protect their investments.
2.

The Impetus for Clawback Clauses in Minor League Contracts

Despite the increase in signing bonuses, teams continued to retain little
protection for their large, risky investments. Like other professional sports,
injuries unexpectedly stifled the anticipated brilliance of many talented
signees.120 Other things also unexpectedly limited player development, as, in
fact, sometimes players simply chose to walk away from the game.
Ryan Jaroncyk perhaps best exemplifies this phenomenon. Drafted in the
first round by the New York Mets in 1995, Jaroncyk netted an $850,000
signing bonus.121 He had all the physical assets to be a major league

the next agreement. Jim Callis, Jim Callis Chat: Aug. 17, BASEBALL AM. (Aug. 17, 2011),
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/chat/2011/2612226.html (stating that the
prospect for hard slotting was next to zero).
115. Jim Callis, Prospects Chat with Jim Callis, BASEBALL AM. (June 16, 2010),
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/chat/2010/2610204.html.
116. See Callis, supra note 1 (stating that in 2011 MLB “leaned on teams harder than ever to
adhere to an informal slotting system” and that “political pressure” is exerted on clubs “to toe the
line”).
117. See Kevin Goldstein, Future Shock: Do We Really Need to ‘Fix’ the Draft?, BASEBALL
PROSPECTUS (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=11804
(describing the lack of an enforcement mechanism in soft slotting).
118. Since soft slotting was instituted in 2000, first-round bonuses have increased by 2.3%
per year, compared to an increase of 26.9% per year in the 1990s. Callis, supra note 90.
119. Major League Baseball and the players’ union agreed in a new collective bargaining
agreement, effective in December 2011, to make major changes to the Rule 4 draft. MLB, MLBPA
Reach New Five-Year Labor Agreement, MLB.COM (Nov. 22, 2011, 1:20 PM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26025138&vkey=pr_mlb&c_id
=mlb. Each team will be provided a pool of money to spend on draft picks selected in the top ten
rounds. Id. The pools will be calculated based upon a team’s specific draft picks and teams who
exceed their allotted spending pool will be penalized. Id. While not the equivalent of mandatory
slotting, the new system is still more binding than the previous “soft slotting” system due to the
enforcement mechanism of penalty taxes. See J.J. Cooper & Jim Callis, New CBA Will Bring
Sweeping Changes to Talent Acquisition, BASEBALL AM. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.baseball
america.com/today/draft/news/2012/2612723.html (detailing the penalty tax scheme).
120. Cf. Dobrow, supra note 5 (noting that a total of 32.7 percent of the top draftees between
1981 and 2005 never made the major leagues).
121. Buster Olney, A Met Prospect Walks Away from Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at
B7. The bonus also included a $100,000 college scholarship plan. Id.
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shortstop.122 But he lacked one mental tool that would overshadow all of his
physical talents: he had no desire to play the game.123
Despite the physical attributes and the large bonus, Jaroncyk said that he
“always thought [baseball] was boring.”124 So at the ripe age of twenty years,
just two years after signing his contract and being completely healthy, he
walked away from what he considered to be a “boring” game.125 He never set
foot on a major league baseball field, and the Mets never recovered a dime of
their investment.126
Though uncommon, others would follow Jaroncyk’s lead and join him in
the land of lost prospects. Jaroncyk, who once remarked that he “play[ed] for
God,”127 would be joined in his deistic pursuit by Grant Desme, who retired
from baseball on the verge of stardom to become a priest.128 Justin Hoyman, a
2004 second-round pick by the Cleveland Indians who received a $725,000
signing bonus,129 played all of two seasons in the minor leagues before
promptly retiring.130 Quan Cosby, who received an $825,000 bonus as an
eighteen-year-old in 2001, also left the game after a short career in the minor
leagues.131 Cosby’s reason? He wanted to play football for the University of
Texas.132 Another former prospect, Tom Wilhelmsen, received $250,000 in
2002 from the Milwaukee Brewers as an eighteen-year-old. He filed retirement
papers in 2005 after “a lot of beer and grass.”133
Many might be wondering why a talented player would ever walk away
from baseball so early in his career. While the answer might vary greatly from
individual to individual, it no doubt stems in part from the fact that almost all
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Olney, supra note 121.
127. Id.
128. Jane Lee, Desme Retires to Pursue Priesthood, MLB.COM (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:08 PM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20100122&content_id=7954958.
129. Baseball America Draft Database, 2004 MLB Draft: Round 2, BASEBALL AM.,
http://www.baseballamerica.com/draftdb/rnd.php?rnd=2 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
130. Justin Hoyman, THE BASEBALL CUBE, http://www.thebaseballcube.com/players/pro
file.asp?P=Justin-Hoyman (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). Hoyman might not be considered a pure
runaway, as his brief career was limited by an elbow injury. Kevin T. Czerwinski, Back to School
with Justin Hoyman, MLB.COM (Feb. 27, 2006, 11:27 AM), http://www.minorleaguebase
ball.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20060227&content_id=43772&vkey=news_milb&fext=.jsp.
131. Player Profile, Quan Cosby, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft/play
ers/565752 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
132. Id.
133. Geoff Baker, Pitcher Thriving in 2nd Chance, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at C1;
Bob Harkins, Partied His Way Out, Then Got 2nd Chance, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:51
PM), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/41925004/ns/sports-baseball/. In 2010, Wilhelmsen began a
comeback attempt with another team. Harkins, supra note 133.
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prospects spend years in baseball’s minor leagues prior to reaching the major
leagues. Though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the minor
league lifestyle is less than glamorous.134 The tiresome travel, most of which is
done by bus, grates on players.135 Many young players become homesick from
being away from home for the first time.136 And of course, some, like Jaroncyk
above, simply lack a love for the game. Whatever the reason, baseball
executives soon realized they needed to better protect their risky investments.
Consequently, teams began turning to clawbacks.
3.

The Introduction of Clawback Provisions in Minor League Contracts

In 2006, MLB’s Office of the Commissioner of Baseball responded to the
multiple incidents of young prospects retiring after only a few seasons. The
office distributed new recommended minor league contract language to the
thirty MLB teams.137 The language included a clawback provision to help
protect teams’ investments.138
Recognizing the utility of these provisions, teams quickly added the
language to their uniform player contracts (“UPCs”). By 2007—only a year
later—nearly all teams had begun utilizing the provisions.139 Moreover, due to
the top-down process of incorporation, in which the central office offered
recommended language and teams quickly adopted it, the provisions all looked
remarkably similar. This will be discussed more in the next section.

134. For a discussion of the living environment of players in the minor leagues, see Garrett
Broshuis, Playing for Peanuts, BASEBALL AM. (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.baseballameri
ca.com/today/minors/season-preview/2010/269689.html.
135. See Garrett Broshuis, Postcards from the Bushes, THE SPORTING NEWS, July 21, 2006,
at 69 (describing the feeling of sleeping on a bus like a contortionist).
136. See id. (providing thoughts of missing home during a long season).
137. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, supra note 6. Because of antitrust exemptions
and the absence of a minor league players union, MLB can unilaterally recommend contract
language without going through collective bargaining; most teams subsequently implement it. See
James T. Masteralexis & Lisa P. Masteralexis, If You’re Hurt, Where is Home? Recently Drafted
Minor League Baseball Players are Compelled to Bring Workers’ Compensation Action in
Team’s Home State or in Jurisdiction More Favorable to Employers, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
575, 575–76 (2011) (describing the unilateral implementation of workers’ compensation clauses
into minor league UPCs).
138. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, supra note 6.
139. This information was obtained by reviewing more than forty minor league contracts
from the relevant time period. However, the implementation of the provisions was not
unanimous. In fact, the St. Louis Cardinals decided not to utilize the provisions at all. Email
Interview with John Mozeliak, Vice President and General Manager of Baseball Operations, St.
Louis Cardinals (Jan. 14, 2011). The Cardinals still do not use them, because they rarely have a
need for clawbacks and prefer greater tax flexibility. Id.
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The Various Clawbacks Used by MLB Teams

The clawback provisions instituted by MLB teams all lie within an
addendum to the UPCs that they utilize.140 At their most basic level, they all
operate similarly; they allow a team to recoup a portion of a player’s bonus if a
certain event occurs to trigger the recoupment clause. The triggering event
usually involves either the failure to report to a playing assignment or an
unexcused leave of absence longer than a period of a few weeks.
However, some differences exist in the operational length of the
provisions. Accordingly, two clubs’ provisions will be examined in more
detail, with one provision extending the full length of the contract and the other
being a moderate length provision.
1.

The New York Yankees’ Provision Allows Recoupment over the
Entire Length of the UPC

The New York Yankees include a clawback provision in an addendum to
their minor league UPCs that allows for the recoupment of a portion of the
signing bonus for the full-length of the agreement.141 The exact wording of this
provision is included in Appendix A.
Subpart 2, concerning the operational aspect of the clawback, is
particularly relevant.142 If the triggering event occurs, the team can recoup a
portion of the bonus according to the following formula: the signing bonus
paid to the player is multiplied by the number of seasons remaining on the
player’s contract and then divided by the length of the contract.
An example might further clarify this formula. The initial contracts signed
by minor leaguers almost always span seven years. If a player plays two
seasons before the triggering event occurs, the above-described formula allows
the team to recoup five-sevenths of the already paid signing bonus. To use
Jaroncyk as a hypothetical, this provision would have allowed the team to
recoup $607,142.86 of his $850,000 signing bonus since he retired after only
two years.143 If he had instead played five seasons instead of two, the team
could have still recouped two-sevenths, or $242,857.14, of the bonus. This
140. This addendum, Addendum B, is one of the only parts of the contract that is negotiable,
as altering other portions of the contract is discouraged. See David M. Szuchman, Note, Step Up
to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 265, 281–82, 287–90 (1996) (discussing the parts of minor league contracts that are
negotiable and also discussing the mechanics of the draft and baseball’s antitrust exemption in
great detail).
141. First-year minor league player agreements, with very few exceptions, last for seven
seasons (the equivalent of roughly seven years). Szuchman, supra note 140, at 282.
142. Paragraph 1 of the provision also allows for the relinquishment of any right to an unpaid
signing bonus, though this will rarely come into effect since the full amount of signing bonuses
are usually paid within two years. See infra Appendix A.
143. Olney, supra note 121.
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would have been a significant deterrent to leaving the game prior to the
expiration of the agreement, and certainly a deterrent to leaving early in the
agreement.
2.

The San Diego Padres Utilize a More Moderate Length Clawback
Provision

While the Yankees’ clawback extends the full length of the agreement,
other teams extend the provision for a more moderate length. The San Diego
Padres, for instance, include a clawback provision lasting only the first three
years of the seven-year agreement.144 The actual provision is included in
Appendix B. The language of the clawback remains strikingly similar to the
Yankees’ provision with the exception of the second paragraph. In this
paragraph, the language clearly states that the “Recoupment Period” will only
last for the first three seasons of the UPC. The formula used to calculate the
recoupment amount remains the same.
This change in language becomes very important. While Jaroncyk would
be subjected to the same clawback under either provision since he only played
two seasons, some of the other players described above would not be subjected
to any clawback at all. For instance, Quan Cosby played four minor league
seasons before choosing to play football at Texas.145 Under the Yankees’
provision, he would be subjected to a clawback of three-sevenths of his bonus,
but under the Padres’ provision he would be subjected to no clawback at all, as
the three-year recoupment period would have expired.
As demonstrated, the difference between the provisions can potentially be
significant. Nevertheless, there are more overall similarities between the
provisions—and between all provisions used by MLB teams—than there are
differences. Importantly, they are all an example of a prospective clawback,146
and they are all robust enough to operate as a deterrent to unfair behavior.147
3.

New Clawback Regulations in the 2011 CBA

The 2011 Major League Baseball-Major League Baseball Players
Association Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) mandates an
unexpected change in minor league clawback provisions. While the exact
details have not been publicly released, industry insiders state that specific

144. See infra Appendix B.
145. Quan Cosby, THE BASEBALL CUBE, http://www.thebaseballcube.com/players/pro
file.asp?P=Quan-Cosby (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
146. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 414–15 (discussing the benefits of prospective
clawbacks).
147. Cf. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 735 (calling for businesses to adopt “robust”
clawbacks in executive compensation agreements).
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guidelines will regulate signing bonus clawbacks.148 Importantly, the window
for repayment will be limited according to the size of the bonus. For bonuses
above $1,000,000, teams will be able to institute a five-year recoupment
period, and for bonuses between $250,000 and $1,000,000, a four-year
recoupment period will be available.149 For all other bonuses below this
threshold, the maximum recoupment period will be three years.150
This will force teams such as the Yankees to make changes to their
clawback clauses. More importantly though, it demonstrates the importance
that both MLB and the players’ union place on the clawback provisions. In
short, the clawback has become an industry standard, recognized through
collective bargaining by both sides of the industry.
C. Limitations of the Clawback Provisions
As discussed above, the clawback provisions were instituted to prevent
players from retiring during the early years of their contracts. Considering the
multitude of problems that can occur over a seven-year contract, however, one
must question whether the clawback provision might also extend to other
unexpected (and often undesirable) behavior. For instance, will the provisions
extend to an inability to play due to visa problems or to instances of
misconduct?
1.

The Story of Angel Villalona, a Top Prospect Turned Murder Suspect

An exploration of the career of young prospect Angel Villalona
demonstrates the potential magnitude of visa problems and possible
misconduct. In 2006, the San Francisco Giants signed the sixteen-year-old
Villalona to a contract with a $2.1 million signing bonus.151 The young
Dominican possessed tremendous power and he quickly became the
organization’s third-ranked prospect.152
Once in the United States, Villalona began the process of assimilating to
American culture.153 However, like many Latino players, Villalona returned to
his home nation during the off-season. While visiting his mother in September
148. Telephone Interview with Erik Johnson, MLB Certified Player Agent, Platinum Sports &
Entertainment (Jan. 4, 2012).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Chris Haft, Villalona Appears Headed Back to Giants’ System, MLB.COM (Sept. 2,
2011, 10:40 PM), http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20110902&content_
id=24129456&vkey=news_sf&c_id=sf.
152. Id.
153. See Garret Broshuis, Villalona: Teammate Turned Murder Suspect, LIFE IN THE MINORS
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://minorleaguelife.blogspot.com/2009/09/villalona-teammate-turned-mur
der.html (describing Villalona’s reactions while navigating through “the labyrinth that is
professional baseball”).
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of 2009, he went to a nightclub that he frequented.154 According to reports, a
fight broke out after a man refused to give Villalona his usual seat.155 The fight
rolled out to the streets, and the man was eventually shot to death.156
Villalona was quickly arrested and charged with murder.157 The police
claimed he was the shooter while supporters insisted he was wrongly blamed
because of his wealth.158 Either way, the once promising prospect, in which the
Giants invested more than $2 million, was unable to play baseball. After being
released on $14,000 bail, Villalona had his visa revoked by the U.S. Embassy
and he could not travel.159 For two years, Villalona battled the charges far from
any baseball field.160 Finally, all charges against him were dropped by
prosecutors in 2011.161
2.

Would a Standard Clawback Provision Allow Recoupment in These
Circumstances?

Villalona now hopes to rejoin the Giants,162 who recently added him to
their roster.163 Despite this, it is worth exploring whether the Giants might be
able to recoup a portion of the $2.1 million signing bonus due to the lost time.
A review of a Giants minor league contract reveals the use of a clawback
provision identical to that used by the Yankees (Appendix A). Importantly, the
provision states that “if Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without
permission and is absent from Club for a material portion, or for at least two
weeks, of any playing season . . . during the term of this Minor League
Uniform Player Contract” recoupment may take place. The express language
of this broad provision would probably cover Villalona’s situation. Even
though he did not retire, as was the case with Jaroncyk, and even though he
was not convicted of a crime, he certainly failed to report to his club for a
material portion of a playing season, as he was out of baseball for two years.

154. Nanette Asimov & John Shea, Giants Prospect’s Friends Stunned, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
22, 2009, at C5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Henry Schulman & John Shea, Ready to Take Another Swing, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3,
2011, at B3.
159. Jesse Sanchez, Villalona has U.S. Visa Revoked, MLB.COM (Nov. 13, 2009, 7:42 PM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091113&content_id=7664896&vkey=news_mlb&fe
xt=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
160. Schulman & Shea, supra note 158.
161. Id. Additionally, Villalona reportedly paid the family of the victim $138,306. Id.
162. Id.
163. Chris Haft, Villalona among Giants 40-Man Roster Additions, MLB.COM (Nov. 19,
2011, 2:15 AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111119&content_id=26005812&
vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb.
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Villalona might argue that this provision was not intended to cover such
circumstances. Moreover, unusual and unanticipated events made him unable
to report to his team. Yet the express language of the provision would still
allow the Giants to recover a portion of Villalona’s signing bonus. He failed to
receive permission prior to not reporting during the two-year period.
Assumedly, the provision would also cover any other type of visa problems or
other issues that make a player unable to report to an assignment.
The provision fails to explicitly mention misconduct.164 For this reason, a
player who experiences legal problems but who still reports to their work
assignment would probably not be subjected to the clawback provision. For
instance, had Villalona been arrested for a less egregious crime which did not
result in the revocation of his visa, the clawback provision would not apply so
long as he reported to work. However, if properly instituted, the broadly
worded clawback can still operate as a deterrent to behavior that might be
deemed misconduct, for misconduct might eventually lead to the inability to
report to a work assignment.
III. ANALYSIS OF MINOR LEAGUE CLAWBACKS THROUGH CONTRACT LAW
The above discussions demonstrate the utility of clawbacks in minor
league contracts. But where do such clawbacks fit within contract law? And
are they enforceable? These questions will be addressed below.
A.

Clawbacks Reallocate Risk and Discourage Opportunism

One effective way of evaluating minor league clawback provisions comes
by viewing these clauses through the lens of law and economics. After all,
these prospective clawbacks are entirely about allocating the risk upfront, at
the early stages of contract formation. As noted above, teams invest large sums
of money in raw talent, yet these investments remain risky.165 Not only must
teams bear the risk of injury, but, without these provisions, they must bear the
risk of a player simply choosing to walk away from the game.166
Under the default rules, a player can leave at any time after receiving his
large signing bonus and still retain the full amount of the bonus. Contract
remedies such as unjust enrichment and breach of good faith would not allow

164. Minor league UPCs do contain a misconduct provision in section XIX of the UPCs,
entitled “Termination.” Minor League Uniform Player Contract (Nov. 11, 2011) (on file with
author). This provision allows a team to terminate a contract if a player fails to conform to “high
standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship.” Id. It also applies if, among other things,
a player fails “to keep himself in first-class physical condition.” Id. However, the mere
termination of a contract would not allow for the recoupment of any signing bonus already paid to
a player.
165. Dobrow, supra note 5.
166. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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any recoupment. Yet almost any outside observer would find that there is some
inherent unfairness in this.167 Even though the bonus was provided as an
incentive to sign a contract, the club expected the player to put forth a good
faith effort to develop to his full potential.
These clawback provisions allow teams to reset the default rules.168 The
risk of walking away from the game is shifted from the team to the player. The
player is in the best position to prevent this behavior, so the risk re-allocates to
the least-cost avoider.
While legal and economic theory is often used to discourage negligent
contracting, it can also be used to discourage opportunism in contracting.169 As
Professor Cohen states, contracting parties are vulnerable both because they
cannot foresee all possible problems that might arise under the contract and
because parties perform obligations sequentially rather than simultaneously.170
The latter factor is particularly important in promoting opportunism.171
As applied to minor league contracts, it is impossible for either party to
foresee everything that will happen during the seven-year term of the
agreement. This is true both on the player’s side and the team’s side. The team
might sign a veteran free agent or sign other amateur players at the same
position as the young player receiving the signing bonus, which might impede

167. Some inside observers and player advocates would argue that no unfairness is present
due to MLB’s efforts to artificially depress signing bonuses and the miniscule salaries paid to
minor league players. For a discussion on the effort to depress signing bonuses, see supra Part
II.A.1. For a discussion on minor league salaries, see Broshuis, supra note 135.
168. The term “default rules” used in this sense merely means the rules that govern the
contract if no provision is adopted to stipulate otherwise. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
(defining default rules and describing a system for assigning efficient default rules). Given that
the default in the current system of minor league bonuses negatively affects the team, this might
be termed a penalty default. According to Professors Ayres and Gertner, “[p]enalty defaults are
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule
and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.” Id. at 91. However, true
penalty defaults are intentionally set in this manner to provide such an incentive, id., whereas the
current default rules for minor league bonuses seem to simply have been adopted arbitrarily out of
custom.
169. For a discussion of the traditional focus on negligent contracting and the ability of law
and economics to be applied to opportunistic contracting, see Cohen, supra note 8, at 952. Cohen
defines opportunism as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party’s
reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or conventional
morality.” Id. at 957. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93–94 (6th
ed. 2003) (describing the problem of opportunism in contract law and stating the “fundamental
function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes’s day) is to deter people
from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties . . .”).
170. Cohen, supra note 8, at 954–55; see also POSNER, supra note 169, at 93 (stating that “the
problem of contract opportunism arise[s] from the sequential character of economic activity”).
171. Cohen, supra note 8, at 955.
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his path to the major leagues.172 The player might also suffer from injuries,173
which would hinder his development. These problems present unforeseeable
challenges, and both team and player assume some risk due to these
unforeseeable challenges.
Yet lack of simultaneous contractual obligations also creates the risk of
opportunism. The team pays the signing bonus in advance, typically paying
half of the signing bonus almost immediately upon the player’s signing and the
second half during the next year.174 A major contractual obligation for the team
is therefore fulfilled early in the contract. Yet the team does not expect a
benefit from this contract until several years later, as time must be allotted for
the development of the player.175 If a player chooses to retire during this
developmental time period, he may do so. Consequently, it creates an
environment ripe for opportunism.
According to Professor Cohen, one party “may intend to mislead or
deceive the other party from the beginning of the relationship, before the other
party has invested in it.”176 It is impossible to read a player’s mind, and a
player such as Jaroncyk, for instance, may know from the very beginning that
his heart is not in baseball. He may sign the contract simply to obtain the
lucrative signing bonus and then retire as soon as he receives this bonus. At the
least, the team runs the risk that the player will simply not enjoy professional
baseball as much as he had imagined and will have a change of heart. Though
this latter scenario might be termed unintentional opportunism, it is still
opportunism, and perhaps bad faith.
The default rules do little to discourage this opportunistic behavior,177 as
most of the risk allocates to the team. The addition of the clawback provision
re-allocates this risk to the player, who is both the least-cost avoider and the
potentially opportunistic party.178 In this manner, potential opportunism is
discouraged.
172. Cf. Jason Martinez, About, MLBDEPTHCHARTS.COM, http://www.mlbdepthcharts.com/
2009/03/site-contributors-jason-martinez-san.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (explaining that the
website is devoted strictly to the ever-changing world of MLB depth charts).
173. Cf. Nate Silver & Will Carroll, The Injury Nexus, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 26,
2003), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=1658 (providing a statistical
breakdown of the rate of injuries in pitchers and finding that pitchers under the age of 24 are more
prone to elbow and shoulder injuries).
174. Darren Heitner, Value of Signing Bonuses, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (July 24, 2006),
http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2006/07/24/value-of-signing-bonuses/.
175. See Ben Lindbergh, Overthinking It, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=13018 (computing the average age of
major league debuts and the amount of previous minor league experience for prospects).
176. Cohen, supra note 8, at 955.
177. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 168, at 98.
178. For a discussion on when a party is both a least-cost avoider and a “most-likelyopportunist,” see Cohen, supra note 8, at 979.
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Clawback Provisions as a Good Business Practice

Although these provisions discourage opportunism, some might still
question the utility of these provisions. After all, by using these provisions, a
team exerts pressure on a player to remain at a job against his will. This
assumedly results in an unhappy employee, and most personnel managers
would agree that an unhappy employee is not a good employee.179 Moreover,
one person’s unhappiness can easily spread to others, and the development of
other talented young players might be hindered.180
It is also questionable whether a player seeking to walk away will ever
develop to his full potential. As Jaroncyk, Desme, and other examples
demonstrate, young players sometimes realize that baseball simply is not for
them. Once a player realizes this, it is unlikely they will enthusiastically work
to fully develop their skills. If the player is pressured to stay, the team will
continue to invest time in the player’s development and will continue to give
the player opportunities. The time and opportunities invested in the player will
cost the team money.181 Moreover, these resources could be devoted to other,
more committed players. Consequently, perhaps the most efficient solution
would allow the team and player to simply sever their relationship.
However, human beings are prone to attitudinal changes as situations
change.182 This is no doubt especially true of young, talented athletes who are
still in the midst of identity formation.183 Perhaps the presence of a clawback
provision persuading a player to remain within an organization for a longer
time will result in the player experiencing a change-of-heart. For instance, one
of the Kansas City Royals’ top prospects, Danny Duffy, recently sought to
leave the game while attending spring training in 2010.184 Instead of altogether
quitting the game, the Royals persuaded Duffy to take a short leave of

179. See, e.g., Lise M. Saari & Timothy A. Judge, Employee Attitudes and Job Satisfaction,
43 HUMAN RES. MGMT. 395, 398 (2004) (reviewing research on employee satisfaction and
performance).
180. See Rob Stein, Happiness Can Spread Among People Like a Contagion, Study Indicates,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2008, at A8 (stating that unhappiness spreads from person to person, though
not as strongly as happiness).
181. See Andrew Zimbalist, Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps, 11 J. OF SPORTS
ECON. 17, 18 (2010) (noting that MLB teams spend an average of $20.6 million each year on
player development).
182. See, e.g., David C. Funder & Daniel J. Ozer, Behavior as a Function of the Situation, 44
J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 108–110 (1983) (providing an overview of some of
the more famous examples of situationism).
183. Cf. Peter Kaufman & Kenneth A. Feldman, Forming Identities in College: A
Sociological Approach, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 463, 488 (2004) (studying the effect of the
college experience on identity formation).
184. J.J. Cooper, Royals Lefty Duffy Quits Baseball, BASEBALL AM. (Mar. 24, 2010, 10:57
AM), http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/prospects/2010/03/royals-lefty-duffy-quits-baseball/.
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absence.185 After this leave of absence, Duffy had a change-of-heart and
returned to the team.186 The next year he was pitching in the major leagues.187
Clawbacks have the potential to facilitate more success stories similar to
Duffy.188 Even though the provisions pressure a player to remain in the game
against his will, they might allow time for attitudinal change. The stress of a
previous bad season might pass if success is again found, and homesickness
might fade as a player matures. Moreover, the provisions simply persuade a
player to fulfill an expected part of the bargain.189 In short, the use of clawback
provisions is a sound business practice within baseball.
C. Enforceability of Clawback Provisions in Baseball UPCs
As previously described, these clawback provisions efficiently re-allocate
the risk to the party who is both the least-cost avoider and the potentially
opportunistic party. Despite this efficiency, questions might still arise as to the
enforceability of these contract provisions, as these types of clawbacks have
never been challenged.190 Specifically, the provisions might be challenged
under the doctrine of unconscionability due to the contractual circumstances
surrounding the bargaining process.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts may choose
not to enforce an unconscionable contract.191 While the Restatement does not
define unconscionability,192 the official comment section places importance on
the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract.193
When analyzing unconscionability, many courts focus on the presence of
unreasonably favorable terms or the absence of meaningful choice.194 These

185. Rustin Dodd, The Return of Danny Duffy. . . (and Why the Royals May Need to Open a
Leftorium), K.C. STAR (June 3, 2010, 5:57 PM), http://royalsblog.kansascity.com/?q=node/546.
186. Id.
187. Steve Gardner, Royals Calling Up Pitching Prospect Danny Duffy, USA TODAY,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/fantasywindup/post/2011/05/royals-calling-up-pitchingprospect-danny-duffy/1 (last updated May 18, 2011).
188. During my playing career with the San Francisco Giants, I saw first-hand the ability of
clawbacks to bring forth such a possibility. Similar to Duffy, one of the Giants’ prospects—who
will remain anonymous—sought to leave the game during spring training. He had only pitched in
the minor leagues for a single season, and when he informed the Giants’ organization of his
intentions, he was told that he would have to pay back a large portion of his bonus due to
language in his contract. Upon hearing this, he remained with the organization, and he ultimately
became a successful major league pitcher.
189. See supra Part III.A.
190. Non-disclosure clawbacks have been challenged. Melone, supra note 9, at 70.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
192. Id. The UCC also fails to define unconscionability in its codification of the doctrine.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1979).
194. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 301 (4th ed. 2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

210

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:185

two concepts have often been called substantive unconscionability and
procedural unconscionability.195 Courts typically require at least some
evidence of both elements in order for a contract provision to be deemed
unconscionable.196
The substantive element “focuses on overly harsh or one-sided results.”197
The procedural element, on the other hand, focuses on oppression or
surprise.198 Oppression in contracting derives from an inequality of bargaining
power resulting in an absence of meaningful choice,199 while surprise is found
when terms are deceptively hidden200 or when a party is incapable of
understanding the terms.201
In examining these contract provisions, one immediate procedural problem
arises from the bargaining circumstances. Since MLB teams have collectively
acted to limit a player’s choices through the implementation of the draft, the
players’ relative bargaining power has diminished. After all, this was the very
reason behind the implementation of the draft, as MLB hoped that the
diminished bargaining power would result in depressed signing bonuses.202
Further evidence of the players’ lower relative bargaining power is found
due to their ability—or often inability—to secure representation. The NCAA
places strict regulations on a player’s ability to obtain representation during the
draft process through its “No Agent” Rule.203 Many top players still retain
agents such as Boras to bargain for them,204 but teams know that players risk

195. Id.; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (delineating between substantive and procedural
unconscionability).
196. FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, § 4.28, at 302. Courts will allow for a sliding scale
between the two elements, for if one element is found in great magnitude, sometimes less
evidence of the other element will be required. Id.
197. Gatton v. T-mobile, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
198. Id. at 352.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971).
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. NCAA bylaws allow a player to obtain advice from an “advisor,” but the advisor cannot
have direct contact with any MLB team on the player’s behalf. Consequently, if an advisor does
any negotiating, the player will lose his amateur status even if he does not sign a professional
contract. See Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the
Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005); Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent
Rule Called Out, but Remains Safe, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 303 (2010).
204. Aaron Fitt, Nebraska’s Ehlers Suspended for 60 Percent of Season, BASEBALL AM.
(Mar. 9, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/2011/03/nebraskasehlers-suspended-for-60-percent-of-season/ (stating that “major league scouting directors and
college coaches have reaffirmed to Baseball America time and time again, nearly every drafted
player has an adviser who has contact with professional clubs on his behalf . . .”).
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their amateur status (and NCAA eligibility) if they fail to come to terms with
the team.205 This limits a player’s options, as a team may use this as a
bargaining chip during negotiations, resulting in reduced bargaining power.
While top players employ representation, many lower level players elect
not to use representation when going through the draft. Due to their lack of
representation (and lower level of talent) these players have far less bargaining
power than top picks. Yet, they still will be subjected to the clawback
provision.
Although there is no evidence that agents have attempted to negotiate these
clawback provisions out of contracts, one irony is that the top picks—for
whom the clawbacks were implemented—are in the greatest position to
negotiate the removal of these provisions. They have the high level of talent
that leads to increased leverage, and they usually employ representation to aid
in bargaining. The lower picks, however, have no ability to negotiate such a
removal.
One could easily state from these facts that an inequality in bargaining
power is present, especially for lower picks. This results in a lack of
meaningful choice. However, unequal bargaining power alone does not make a
contract provision unconscionable.206 While it satisfies procedural
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability must also be found.
Substantive unconscionability requires overly harsh or one-sided results,
and the best argument for this might be found in the lower picks. These players
often are not deemed prospects and have a far lower chance of making it to the
major leagues than the top picks. Yet the implementation of clawback
provisions pressure these players to continue to play in the minor leagues until

205. Pitcher Logan Ehlers was suspended for sixty percent of his 2011 collegiate season after
violating the “no agent” rule prior to enrolling at the University of Nebraska. Id. Amateur pitcher
Andy Oliver rejected an offer of $390,000 after being drafted by the Minnesota Twins in 2006.
Morgan, supra note 203, at 303–04. He subsequently played at Oklahoma State, but when the
NCAA learned in 2008 that Oliver had representation through the prior draft process, they ruled
him ineligible to play. Id. at 304–05. Shortly thereafter, a similar situation developed with pitcher
James Paxton after talks broke down between his agent, Scott Boras, and the Toronto Blue Jays,
and he attempted to re-enroll at the University of Kentucky. Richard G. Johnson, Submarining
Due Process: How the NCAA Uses its Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of their Right
of Access to the Courts…Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459, 501–03, 579
(2010).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1979) (“A bargain is not
unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even
because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent . . . to the
unfair terms.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, § 4.28, at 302 (“[I]nequality of bargaining power
is not by itself enough . . . .”).
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a) the team relieves them of their duties, or b) their contract expires. The use of
the longer clawback provision (exhibited by the Yankees) effectively
constrains their mobility for fear of the economic recoupment of their bonus.
Many would say that such an employment situation results in at least some
unfairness.
Even when the long-term clawback provision is applied to these lower
picks, however, the level of unfairness does not reach the point of an overly
harsh or one-sided bargain. After all, the clawback provision merely ensures
that the player will perform his duties as expected under the contract. The
provision acts as a condition,207 and it only becomes operable when a player
fails to perform his obligations under the employment contract. Moreover,
clawbacks have now become part of the latest CBA.208 As a result, the
recoupment period will be limited to three years for the lower picks, which will
eliminate some of the harshness involved. In certain circumstances, some
unfairness might still result, but it will not be enough to meet the standards of
substantive unconscionability.
Courts typically require both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
While substantial evidence of procedural unconscionability arises under these
bargaining conditions, there exists little evidence of substantive
unconscionability. Consequently, these provisions—even the harshest of them
as applied to the weakest of players—will be upheld.
IV. APPLICATIONS OUTSIDE OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
The use of clawback provisions in minor league baseball demonstrates
their contractual utility, especially in an environment ripe for opportunism. But
will this utility extend to other business arenas, such as executive
compensation?
A.

Executive Compensation: Another Environment Ripe for Opportunism

Similar to highly talented baseball prospects, experienced business
executives are a scarce commodity. Due to their scarcity and talent, they
command large bonuses.209 Also, as will be demonstrated below, the potential
for opportunism exists in the realm of executive compensation just as it exists
in minor league baseball.
Potential opportunism in executive compensation stems in part from the
agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control in publicly
207. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 416–17 (discussing how clawback provisions
operate as conditions).
208. Telephone Interview with Erik Johnson, supra note 148.
209. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 702–04 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(describing Disney’s efforts through a bidding war to land a talented executive who ultimately
received $130 million after only fourteen months on the job).
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traded companies, which places executives in a position to take advantage of
their power.210 Moreover, executives often exert great influence over the board
of directors, which limits executive oversight.211 Even when businesses utilize
pay committees comprised of independent directors, the great influence of the
executive might still be felt.212 After all, managers influence the appointment
of independent directors, and independent directors are influenced by board
dynamics that reduce arms-length bargaining.213 Such an environment
encourages opportunistic behavior, as it places the executive in a position to
take advantage of another party’s vulnerabilities.214
As a potential solution, many companies attempt to align compensation to
company success through performance metrics.215 However, opportunism can
still remain a problem. For instance, if performance metrics are too simplistic,
or if too much cash or too many equity options are linked to short-term
performance, then opportunistic behavior is still incentivized.216 In such a
situation, even the most honest executive might be tempted to maximize shortterm gains at the expense of long-term company goals.
B.

Like in Baseball, Executive Opportunism Can Be Deterred Through
Clawbacks

Just as the institution of clawback provisions in minor league contracts
deter potential opportunism, properly drafted clawback provisions in executive
compensation contracts can operate similarly. To do so, the provisions should
be drafted carefully, since executive compensation packages are more
complicated than minor league contracts. Annual cash and equity earnings
should be covered, but long-term incentives and deferral programs should also
be covered.217 Moreover, the triggering act must be broader than the material
210. See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2007) (describing the “managerial
power school” of executive compensation that believes that “pay practices represent a taking
advantage of . . . the agency problems in large public firms”).
211. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 733.
212. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 766 (2002) (stating
that “[t]he key problem is the pervasive influence of management . . . on all facets of the paysetting process”).
213. Id.
214. See Posner, supra note 169, at 93–95 (describing different scenarios that allow a person
to opportunistically take advantage of another’s vulnerabilities).
215. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 233–241
(1999−2000) (describing the movement towards performance-based executive compensation).
216. See Heineman Jr., supra note 76 (calling for an end to “naked” cash bonuses and
“naked” stock options).
217. Id.
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restatement of financials required by the Dodd-Frank Act.218 This
recommendation stems from the fact that even a small error in a firm’s
earnings might lead to an executive receiving substantial excess pay if a
performance threshold is met.219 Yet the small error might not be deemed
material, so no restatement would be required, and no Dodd-Frank clawback
would be triggered.220
C. Potential Obstacles to Implementation
One potential obstacle to implementing broader clawbacks in executive
compensation contracts emerges from the fact that, unlike young baseball
prospects, business executives bargain for their contracts in a purely open
market system. As discussed above, the use of a draft system allows a baseball
prospect to only bargain with a single team. No such restriction exists with
executives. Furthermore, the same executive power that leads to potential
opportunism also makes the implementation of more robust clawbacks
problematic. After all, an executive with great sway over directors—and even
sway over independent directors on a pay committee—might successfully
resist any implementation that goes beyond the legal requirements.
While these obstacles might make implementation more problematic,
clawbacks are worth the battle required to overcome the obstacles. Ultimately,
a well-drafted and robust clawback provision has the ability to systematically
deter opportunistic behavior by holding senior leadership accountable while
simultaneously promoting long-term growth, sustainability, proper risk taking,
and balanced senior leadership.221 Consequently, the utility of clawback
provisions necessitates their inclusion.222
CONCLUSION
Although the use of clawbacks has grown tremendously in the past fifteen
years, commentators still question their utility. However, the use of clawback
provisions in minor league baseball contracts demonstrates their ability to deter
opportunism. Furthermore, clawbacks can be used to deter opportunism in
218. Id.
219. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 748.
220. Id.
221. Heineman Jr., supra note 76.
222. It has been argued that government-regulated clawbacks will reduce incentive pay, and a
similar argument might be made against voluntary clawbacks. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at
1807 (arguing that Dodd-Frank clawbacks will reduce the use of incentive compensation).
However, this argument is based on an unpublished study focused on the SOX clawback, which
differs significantly in that the SOX clawback requires all incentive compensation to be recouped
in the event of both misconduct and a restatement. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 746–47. As
Professors Fried and Shilon point out, merely requiring an executive to pay back undeserved pay
should not distort pay arrangements. Id.
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other arenas, such as executive compensation. If drafted properly and instituted
prospectively, a robust clawback provision can effectively reassign risk to the
least cost avoider, and can simultaneously allow desired behavior such as
proper risk-taking by an executive.
As one court stated not long ago, “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate
governance practices for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit
stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid
liability.”223 Indeed, properly drafted prospective clawbacks that go beyond the
minimal legal requirements do possess such mystical potential. Their usage
should not only continue but increase.
GARRETT R. BROSHUIS

223. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
 J.D. Candidate, 2013, Saint Louis University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor
Miriam A. Cherry for providing invaluable insight and expertise in the development of this topic.
Thanks also to all those in the baseball industry who assisted me in so many ways. Lastly, thanks
to my other, better half both for her patience and encouragement throughout this process.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: New York Yankees clawback provision from a 2009 minor
league UPC
Signing Bonus
Subject to the conditions set forth below, Player shall receive a signing bonus,
only upon approval of this contract by the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball, which shall be payable as shown below.
If Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without permission and is absent
from Club for a material portion, or for at least two weeks, of any playing
season (which includes the championship season, any training required by
Club in preparation for such championship season and any post-season that the
team or affiliate to which the Player is assigned participates) during the term of
this Minor League Uniform Player Contract (“UPC”),
1) Player shall relinquish and forfeit any right to, and Club shall not be
obligated to pay, any portion of the amount not yet paid pursuant to the
payment schedule set forth in this signing bonus provision and
2) Player shall immediately return and refund to Club, and relinquish and
forfeit any right to, that portion of the signing bonus already paid to
Player by Club, regardless of the year of payment, that exceeds the
amount of signing bonus already paid to Player by Club (i) multiplied
by the number of championship seasons Player reported to, and did not
subsequently abandon without permission, Club and (ii) divided by the
number of championship seasons covered by the term of this UPC.
Appendix B: San Diego Padres clawback provision from a 2011 minor league
UPC
Signing Bonus
Subject to the conditions set forth below, Player shall receive a signing bonus,
only upon approval of this contract by the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball, which shall be payable as shown below:
If Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without permission and is absent
from Club for a material portion, or for at least two weeks, of any playing
season (which includes the championship season, any training required by
Club in preparation for such championship season and any post-season that the
team or affiliate to which the Player is assigned participates) during the first 3
(three) playing seasons of the term of this Minor League Uniform Player
Contract (“UPC”) (the “Recoupment Period”),
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1) Player shall relinquish and forfeit any right to, and Club shall not be
obligated to pay, any portion of the amount not yet paid pursuant to the
payment schedule set forth in this signing bonus provision and
2) Player shall immediately return and refund to Club, and relinquish and
forfeit any right to, that portion of the signing bonus already paid to
Player by Club, regardless of the year of payment, that exceeds the
amount of signing bonus already paid to Player by Club (i) multiplied
by the number of championship seasons Player reported to, and did not
subsequently abandon without permission, Club and (ii) divided by the
number of championship seasons covered by the term of this UPC.
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